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Private Equity and Public Good
By Stephen F. Diamond

T

collapse of the credit markets over the last year has hit more than just the
homebuilding and mortgage sectors of the economy. As interest rates increased, private
equity, or “PE,” an important new form of financial capital, was also rocked on its heels.
HE

PE funds have grown substantially in size as well as political and financial significance in the
last decade. The Blackstone Group, for example, one of a handful of top-tier PE funds,
recently announced a takeover of the Hilton Hotels Corporation for $26 billion. Cerberus
Capital, another major PE player, surprised many when it announced plans to buy the
troubled Chrysler Group from DaimlerChrysler—a pioneering venture into the top ranks of
industrial America. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR), one of the oldest PE funds,
currently owns such a large number of independent businesses that it is, indirectly, the second
largest employer in America, with 560,000 employees, twice as many as General Motors,
ahead of McDonald’s and just behind Wal-Mart. Today’s PE fund managers have been hailed
widely in the business press as the new “masters of the universe,” pushing aside bond traders
and investment bankers, not to mention lowly chief executive officers. The managers of the
largest funds are billionaires. Henry Kravis, the second “K” in KKR, has a wing named after
him at New Y ork’s Metropolitan Museum of Art.
But as liquidity dried up last summer, the major banks that had made billions of dollars in
loans to PE funds to finance the buyouts of companies like Chrysler, Clear Channel, or the
United Kingdom’s Alliance Boots retail pharmacy giant, were unable to resell those loans into
the wider capital markets. In turn this caused the critical flow of capital to PE funds to seize
up, leading some to predict a quick end to the recent leveraged buyout boom. Within a few
months, however, evidence emerged that the PE sector was already shaking off the summer
crisis. At the summer’s end, according to the Wall Street Journal, Blackstone announced it
had closed the largest buyout fund in history “despite the recent red flags in the debt markets,”
raising a total of $21.7 billion. This included a $1 billion commitment from the California
State Teachers’ Retirement System “along with a host of other big public pension funds.” The
Carlyle Group in early September announced that it had successfully raised 5.3 billion euros
for its European-based buyout operations.
The PE Worldview
PE fund managers argue that they offer a potential solution to what many have long argued
is the core problem of the modern corporation: the ability of insiders of public companies to
take advantage of outside shareholders. This tension between corporate managers and public
investors has become a key factor in post-Enron debates about corporate governance and
finance on Wall Street and in Washington, D.C. The labor movement is playing a crucial role
in these debates through traditional lobbying but also through its newly established

shareholder activist programs at the AFL-CIO and Change to Win and at several major
affiliates, such as the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the
Teamsters, and the Service Employees International Union. These and other critics of
corporate behavior argue that the “financialization” of the modern economy lies behind the
distorted behavior of corporations. But this is a misguided view of modern capitalism and
largely irrelevant to an assessment of PE funds. For the new corporate responsibility
movement to reach its full potential, a new approach is required.
PE funds take companies private by buying up the publicly traded stock of a target firm and,
arguably, because of their complete control of the company, more effectively deploy firm
assets to productive and profitable uses. The senior inside managers now have one boss, the
PE fund, to whom they must respond rather than thousands of dispersed public shareholders.
This appears to allow firms to act more decisively. For example, Robert Nardelli, the
controversial new CEO of the auto giant Chrysler, which was recently taken over by Cerberus
Capital, told the New York Times that the company has “become more nimble” and that a
new slogan at the company is being used to describe decision-making: “Either a yes or a no
but not a slow maybe.” Thus, a recent decision on cutting production by 85,000 vehicles was
made in “seven minutes,” he said, while it would have taken three months at publicly traded
Toyota.
Once a firm’s managers have generated the benefits from this new decisiveness and flexibility,
the PE fund will eventually resell the target firm to another private owner or back to the
public in an initial public offering (IPO). These resales can generate huge profits for the PE
funds’ professional staff and outside investors. In a recent, albeit extreme, example, the $4.3
billion buyout of British company Travelport, owner of the online travel Web site Orbitz,
returned 100 percent of the $1 billion in equity invested in the company by its new PE owners,
Blackstone and Technology Crossover Ventures, in less than a year. The firm used a new
technique called a “dividend recapitalization”—it borrowed more money once taken over and
issued that borrowed money as a dividend to the PE funds.
Whether the restructuring put in place at such companies is rational or destructive is a hotly
debated issue. Travelport laid off hundreds of workers in its first year under new private
ownership but contends it has hired hundreds of new workers, no doubt at much lower wages,
as well as invested heavily in new technology. At Chrysler such decisiveness was used to
pressure the United Auto Workers union into unprecedented concessions that will lead to a
dramatic downsizing of the work force as well as huge wage cuts. The ratification vote by
union members was very close, with opposition led by one of the UAW’s own lead negotiators,
Bill Parker, head of a large Chrysler union local. CEO Nardelli, however, called the agreement
“revolutionary,” claiming it is “a major step forward” to restoring the company’s
competitiveness. What is not at issue, however, is that PE funds mark a potentially dramatic
change in the ownership structure of American businesses, with important implications for
labor and society as a whole. Y et the reaction to this development varies widely across the left
and the trade union movement. Some view the emergence of PE funds as a source of new
profitability for labor-managed pension funds, while others argue that the funds represent
another step in the dominance of “financial” capital that undermines job security and union
power.
THE ARRIVAL of a potentially new stage in the history of capitalism is, without doubt, an

unusual and perhaps perplexing event. The last such moment was marked seventy-five years
ago by the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932 by legal
scholar Adolf Berle and economist Gardiner Means. Their book is now recognized as a critical,
if flawed, study of the publicly traded corporation, which was then still a relatively new and
little understood institution. Their analysis of the potential tension between inside managers
and outside investors remains relevant to the dysfunction that, to this day, often can plague
the public corporation. Berle and Means argued that when corporations sell shares to the
wider public it enables the firm’s inside managers to control the day-to-day operations of the
business, often taking advantage of that privileged position to enrich themselves at the
expense of outside investors. Anecdotally, that would appear to be self-evident in the wake of
the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and a myriad of other firms over the last
few years. PE funds appear to offer a different approach to managing businesses, definitely
still capitalist but distinct from the Berle-Means paradigm firm with its separation between
ownership and control. Because PE funds close the gap between ownership and control they
presumably eliminate the damage that gap can generate. Thus, PE funds mobilize hundreds
of billions of dollars in the capital markets with the purpose, it is argued, of resolving the
failings of public corporations that Berle and Means first identified.
Although PE funds may respond to a genuine and deep problem inherent in the nature of the
public corporation, however, they bring with them their own peculiar set of problems some of
which may be more destabilizing and socially destructive than any wrought by Enron and its
progeny. And while many on the left and in the labor movement may appear to comprehend
the nature of these new funds, their perspective is limited by the intellectual impact today of
the framework put in place by Berle and Means in the 1930s. Does the story that PE funds tell
about insider mismanagement make sense? Should we welcome the PE buyout strategy as a
necessary pill to swallow? An effective response to the new capitalism requires a
reconsideration of the dominant Berle-Means paradigm.
The “Problem” with the Public Corporation
Berle and Means had two aims with their 1932 study: To explore what they thought was the
central governance problem of the public corporation as described here but also to situate a
solution to that problem within their social democratic vision of governance. The former has
lived on, even in the mainstream law and economics scholarship that dominates much of the
academic and policy debate about corporate behavior. But the latter has gone down the
memory hole.
Berle and Means argued that although the public corporation solved one problem for
capitalism it created yet another for society at large. The demands of the rapid industrial
growth of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries required massive amounts of
capital that individual businessmen, even if they were as wealthy as J.P. Morgan or Andrew
Carnegie, could not provide. Sometimes this was a “push” process: family-controlled firms
began to sell off ever-larger portions of their firms to outside investors. Sometimes it was a
“pull” process: Wall Street firms engineered the roll up of small family-owned entities into
larger, more efficient and, thus, profitable entities, earning sizable fees in the process. The food
retail giant known today as Safeway began its life this way, when Charles Merrill (the founder
of banking giant Merrill Lynch) engineered the merger of thousands of smaller local stores
into a new entity that he then “took public” through the issuance of shares on the New Y ork
Stock Exchange. For the first time in U.S. history, the business of America was genuinely a

public endeavor. Whereas 4.4 million Americans owned shares in 1900, by 1928 the number
had risen to 18 million.
The growing weight of publicly traded companies raised an alarm for Berle and Means. They
argued that the modern corporation “has brought a concentration of economic power which
can compete on equal terms with the modern state.” The potential social damage that could
be done by the new institution was sharply highlighted by the collapse of the capital markets
in 1929. For these New Deal intellectuals this triggered the need for a “constitutional”
approach to the governance of the corporation that would regenerate legitimacy to the
decision-making processes of what was to them as much a sociopolitical institution as an
economic one.
Driving this political approach was their insight into the inherent problem of the corporation:
that it was plagued as suggested here by a fundamental separation of ownership and control.
Smith and Marx, among others, had mentioned this issue in passing, but in eras when the
“joint stock” company, as it was largely known in the nineteenth century, had nowhere near
the importance it took on by the early twentieth. Because Berle and Means viewed that
separation as a permanent and serious disability, it required a new doctrinal approach to
corporate law. In fact, their argument presented a deep challenge to then-dominant freemarket liberalism: if the corporate form contained within it two competing interest groups,
managers and investors, then this tore asunder the notion of a civil society of competing
individual businesspersons with clear and unambiguous property rights to their business assets
generating efficient, and sociopolitically legitimate, outcomes through arms-length trading in
the marketplace. The emergence of the modern publicly traded corporation, then, arguably
triggered a larger crisis in political theory.
To help solve this problem—and to do so within the boundaries of some form of “capitalism”—
the authors looked to the already established law of trusts to argue that corporate managers,
those who “controlled” the corporation, had to behave with as much rectitude on behalf of
outside shareholders, the “owners” of the corporation, as the trustees of a trust fund did for the
beneficiaries of the trust. As then Judge, and later Justice, Benjamin Cardozo wrote in a
widely cited 1928 opinion issued just as Berle and Means were conducting their initial
research, “A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive is the standard of behavior.”
This approach proved too much for most New Deal-era politicians, who backed away from
the most radical proposals coming out of Franklin Roosevelt’s brain trust. But the federal
securities laws, including the Investment Company Act that regulates private equity funds, did
create new forms of oversight of corporations and financial institutions that remain in place
today, if in muted form.
Today’s Agency School
While Berle and Means’s more radical vision did not survive, their imago of the conflict
between insider managers and outside investors is imprinted in the psyche of every business
and law school graduate in the country. It is widely believed that most of our corporate law
and financial structures are aimed at solving the problems that result from this conflict.
Today, they are know as agency problems—with inside managers of the public corporation
cast as “agents” of the outside shareholders or “principals.” There are costs associated with this
principal-agency relationship known as “agency costs.”

These include the time and money that principals must spend to negotiate contractual
protections with agents and to monitor the agents during the life of the contract. If the
contractual terms are violated or the contract proves, as is often the case, incomplete, further
costs will be incurred by the need to engage in ex post gap filling through dispute resolution or
judicial or legislative intervention. Some theorists of the agency school go so far as to suggest
that the corporation itself is merely a “nexus of contracts” between all of the suppliers and
purchasers of corporate inputs and outputs, right up to the CEO’s office, where a “labor
market” sets the price and terms under which senior corporate personnel will work. The
advantage of this view is that it appears to solve the legitimacy problem that the Berle and
Means argument highlighted because it finds a way to insert the market mechanism back into
the corporate structure.
Together, these agency costs add to the cost of capital and thus to the cost of “doing business.”
But, agency theorists argue, if laws and contracts are efficiently designed, these costs can be
minimized, and, in fact, the resulting predictability can make investing in such an
environment more attractive. Thus, in today’s debate about competition between national
financial markets such as London and New Y ork, some argue that the higher cost of
regulation in the American markets is worth paying. Others argue that the mix of legal
intervention and private ordering through contractual arrangements has gone awry with
post-Enron reforms such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, raising the costs of managing a public
corporation in the United States to an intolerable level.
But what if you could design a corporate or financial structure that would eliminate so-called
“agency costs”? The result would be truly revolutionary: potentially, at least, it could mean the
elimination, or at least dramatic minimization, of costly contractual negotiations over the
complex relationships that exist today among senior corporate management, boards of
directors, Wall Street financial analysts, individual and institutional investors, and
government regulators. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco—all are considered examples of the problems
that arise when agency problems are not adequately resolved. This is, in part, the justification
used to form private equity funds—they hold out the promise of eliminating the modern
corporation’s agency problems by concentrating ownership and control in a single institution.
Voilà! A problem that has plagued Anglo-American capitalism for more than a century might
just disappear. Interestingly, continental European and Asian capital has largely avoided this
issue by continuing to rely on state, family, or closely networked ownership forms. However,
they have also, it can be argued, lost the opportunity to take the kinds of risks that the use of
“other people’s money” allows one to take with the public corporate form. Nonetheless, private
equity is aggressively entering those markets as well with an agenda that is similar to that
found in the United States and the United Kingdom.
The Labor-Left Counterattack
Trade unions have an ambivalent attitude toward the rise of private equity. On the one hand,
many American labor unions have representatives on the boards of the same pension funds
that are largely responsible for the steady flow of capital into PE funds, and, of course, that
means some union members have benefited handsomely from the funds’ above-average
returns. On the other hand, over the last decade, organized labor has developed a relatively
sophisticated program of investor activism through the Office of Investment at the AFL-CIO,
the Capital Strategies Group of Change to Win, and similar groups at key affiliates. This effort

relies on labor’s pension-fund investments in public companies to raise concerns about
corporate social responsibility, excessive CEO pay, workers’ rights, and internal corporate
governance.
But labor does not seem to have made up its mind whether or not PE funds raise or lower
corporate standards of behavior. When it was clear last spring that German auto giant
Daimler was looking to sell off its troubled Chrysler division, United Auto Workers union
president Ron Gettelfinger said he would oppose a PE bid for the company because such an
investor would “strip and flip” the company. A few weeks later, after a meeting with Cerberus
Capital, which had by then announced a deal with Daimler, Gettelfinger sang a completely
new tune. Without any internal discussion, debate, or vote by the UAW membership at
Chrysler, he announced that the takeover bid by Cerberus Capital for the car company “was in
the best interests of UAW members.” Reacting to Gettelfinger’s endorsement of the deal,
Canadian Auto Workers union leader Buzz Hargrove initially told the New York Times that
“the history of private equity has been to buy, then slash and burn a lot of jobs, and then get
out with a lot of money for a handful of people.” But in very short order, after a meeting with
Cerberus Capital’s CEO, Hargrove, too, reversed course, telling reporters, according to
Edwards Auto Observer, “he was convinced Cerberus was ‘not about slice and dice . . . they’re
in it for the long term.’ ” Some Canadian labor groups have gone even further than verbal
endorsements of PE deals. The Ontario Teachers Pension Fund has its own PE arm and
recently engineered a successful bid to buy out Bell Canada.
The leaders of UNITE HERE! were effusive in their praise for the multibillion-dollar bid by
Blackstone for Hilton Hotels, stating in a press release issued as soon as the deal was
announced that it “welcomed” the transaction contending “Blackstone has demonstrated its
commitment to fair treatment for thousands of hotel workers.” But when Blackstone
announced its intention to sell shares to public investors in an IPO, the AFL-CIO and SEIU,
though not working together, each criticized the transaction. The AFL-CIO wrote the
Securities and Exchange Commission in a call for the enforcement of the governance
requirements of the Investment Company Act against Blackstone. [1] Both labor groups
began campaigning to raise tax rates on PE partners’ income from the carried interest in their
funds.
Unlike North American unions, European labor has been largely united in a campaign against
private equity. In a 2007 report entitled “Private Equity’s Broken Promises,” the Central
Executive Committee of the UK’s GMB, the century-old general workers union with more
than 600,000 members, blasted PE funds. The report lists dozens of examples of British
companies taken over by PE funds using debt to replace equity followed by layoffs and then
exit transactions that led to huge paydays for the partners and investors in the funds. In 2004
the AA, the British automobile insurance and roadside protection association, was bought
from its corporate parent by buyout funds CVC Capital and Permira. The GMB had voted AA
Employer of the Y ear in 2003, but under PE ownership one-third of its work force was laid
off, with disabled workers apparently a particular target, wages were cut, the workday at call
centers was increased from 8 to 11.75 hours, and the GMB was forced out and replaced by a
company union. Meanwhile, the company took on close to $2 billion of new debt and paid
Permira and CVC a special dividend of nearly $1 billion.
A second report issued by the Geneva-based IUF, the international trade union body that

represents 12 million workers in 336 unions in the food, farm, and hotel sectors around the
world, highlighted the impact of debt financing by PE groups. The report noted that although
public companies may have a debt to equity ratio of 1:10, once bought out by a PE fund that
ratio is often reversed. Frequently, PE funds then cause the companies they take over to take
on additional debt in order to pay out a dividend to their investors because an exit opportunity
seems too far away. In a presentation to UK Labour Party MPs, the IUF’s Peter Rossman
noted that KKR and Carlyle shared in a $250 million dividend only a month after closing on
the $4 billion debt-financed buyout of satellite operator PanAmSat. The Trade Union Advisory
Committee (TUAC) to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development joined
in the European campaign, noting in a report last spring that “the high rates of return
required to finance private equity debt-driven buyouts can jeopardize target companies’ longterm interests and provision of decent employment conditions and security for employees.”
TUAC called for regulatory reform of tax rates, corporate governance, transparency, risk
management, and workers’ rights.
“Financialization” or Pluralism Redux?
The focus by unions on the role of debt in PE-led deals is critical, but the impact of debt on the
governance of a firm is not well understood. For several years, labor and left-wing critics of
globalization have promoted the concept of “financialization” as a leading symptom of the
post–cold war capitalist economy. The late Paul Sweezy argued in Monthly Review that by
the end of the 1980s the world economy “had given way to a new structure in which a greatly
expanded financial sector had achieved a high degree of independence and sat on top of the
underlying production system.” (Emphasis added.) Robin Blackburn took a similar approach
recently in the New Left Review, where he wrote, “It is not household names like Nike or
Coca-Cola that are the capstones of contemporary capitalism, but finance houses, hedge
funds, and private equity concerns, many of which are unknown to the general public. In the
end even the largest and most famous of corporations have only a precarious and provisional
autonomy within the new world of business—ultimately they are playthings of the capital
markets.” (Emphasis added.) The IUF’s Rossman calls “financialized capital” “extremely
impatient,” “volatile, highly mobile, and linked to a variety of new financial instruments based
on debt.” In an article for the ILO’s journal Labour Education, Rossman and his IUF
colleague Gerard Greenfield defined “financialization” as “both the enhanced importance of
financial versus real capital in determining the rhythm and returns expected from
investments, and the increased subordination of that investment to the demands of global
financial markets.” (Emphasis added.)
As should be clear, each of these analysts, though coming from different political traditions,
defines the current capitalist period as one in which finance dominates the so-called “real
economy.” This appears to be a relatively simple reprise of the long-standing populist view
that what all too often plagues what would be an otherwise healthy capitalism is a tension
between the interests of “real,” “productive” capitalists who roll up their sleeves and build
companies and those who merely “speculate” using financial assets as so many chips in a
casino. As such, this view is, in fact, a restatement of the original Berle-Means paradigm of
the separation of ownership and control, only in reverse.
Berle and Means were working in a period when it was widely believed that corporate
managers had triumphed over the financial markets. Keynes famously spoke favorably in his
General Theory, published in 1936, of the potential for the “euthanasia of the rentier.” In

Stalin’s Russia, that policy was in fact carried out with unparalleled brutality. Berle and
Means’s book was followed in 1941 by James Burnham’s hugely popular The Managerial
Revolution, which caught the mood of the day when it argued that the United States,
Germany, and Russia were all suffering from the imminent global triumph of a new,
bureaucratic postcapitalist class. In this intellectual and political milieu, it was no surprise that
Berle and Means compared the new boards of directors of public corporations to “a
communist committee of commissars” and cast the corporate director as someone who “more
nearly resembles the communist in mode of thought than he does the protagonist of private
property.” Nor was it shocking for Gardiner Means to write of a new “collective” capitalism
emerging in the United States. Berle and Means’s work was critical because it described a
method by which these managers appeared to have triumphed from within capitalism itself,
aided by a newly expanded Wall Street apparatus of bankers and brokers, leaving the
corporate entity in the hands of technocrats.
AS IT TURNED OUT, of course, Berle and Means were wrong, as were Burnham and Keynes.
Capitalism was not morphing somehow into a Stalinist postcapitalist nightmare. It was true
that the capital markets took many years to recover from the trauma of 1929 and to learn
how to function within the regulatory framework that New Deal legislation imposed on the
economy. But the capital markets never disappeared. As legal scholar Henry Manne suggested
to me, recent research concludes that Berle and Means, in fact, radically overstated the
number of companies with powerless dispersed shareholders. Many publicly held American
businesses retain sizable shareholders with “control blocks” that enable them to influence
managerial decision-making. Thus, most takeovers of public companies are friendly
transactions, with existing management induced in various ways to agree to the acquisition.
Indeed, today’s PE funds often are able to engage in soft-landing takeovers with handsome
premiums paid to shareholders as well, who are then free to redeploy their capital in other
parts of the economy.
In other words, it may have looked as if outside investors had no weight inside the corporate
boardroom, but to have written off that possibility altogether would have meant to argue that
competition itself was no longer operating inside the U.S. economy. No matter how much
influence government regulation or spending may have had at the height of the cold war,
American corporations continued to compete with each other, often bitterly, in capital, labor,
and product markets. New companies financed by Wall Street were formed and prospered;
other older companies faltered, lost support in the financial markets, and went out of business.
Workers fought for and organized unions, engaged in collective actions, and pushed for higher
wages, sometimes successfully, in other cases unsuccessfully.
But if Berle and Means failed on the ideological front, they succeeded in helping to redraw the
framework within which American capitalism was understood. An emerging real world
battleground in the 1930s where, on the one hand, managerial and financial capitalists
together were pitted against, on the other hand, a militant new labor movement with ideas
about the radical reorganization of economic activity, was recast as a need to (social)
democratize the principles that governed the behavior of the new managerial class. This
technocratic analysis became the basis of the dominant postwar ideology of industrial
pluralism, with interest groups competing in the “space” left open between giant business and
labor organizations. It is a similar cold war pluralist ideology that is used by some in
American labor and business groups today to promote “constructive engagement” with the

authoritarian regime in China, arguing that a new “space” is being opened up by the regime’s
market reforms. In fact, there is even less space there for a genuine labor movement than
there was, or is, in a United States dominated by the ever-evolving alliance of managerial and
financial capitalists.
Thus, still transfixed by liberal pluralist ideology from the years of the late–New Deal-era
rollbacks of labor militancy, the left, from socialist to social democratic, was completely
unprepared intellectually for the restructuring of American capitalism that has been
underway for the last twenty years. The attempt to cast today’s developments as the
“financialization” of capitalism is a non sequitur. This view ignores what capitalists actually
do. Instead, whether or not consciously, it gives credence to a popularized argument that
focuses on apparent power shifts within the economy—and, of course, a focus on “power” is
part and parcel of a pluralist worldview. We are not in a corporatist world of interest groups
competing for power, but in a world where owners of capital employ highly specialized
managers, who also have an opportunity to become owners of capital, to generate and
appropriate value in production. Where workers organize, economically and politically, they
must do so in opposition to the organizational intent of those managers and financiers. This is
the very heart of the capitalist process—in China as well as in the United States, as true in
1932 as in 2007.
The Real Nature of Private Equity
It is particularly inapt to cast private equity funds as a form of “financialization” of capitalism.
Private equity actually concentrates in a new institutional form the resources and abilities of
investors together with the on-the-ground knowledge of managers. Although it is true that PE
funds rely heavily on debt and other financial instruments to engage in ever larger deals and
magnify their returns, their success in this effort depends on very careful attention to the
details of how to operate the targeted businesses so that the financial instruments used to take
over control are appropriate to the task. Thus, some may properly criticize the new CEO of
Chrysler, Robert Nardelli, for his outsize pay packages while overseeing a decline in
profitability at Home Depot. But to ignore his deep understanding of the production process
would be foolish. Prior to joining Home Depot, where, of course, he picked up a first-class
education in the consumer goods segment of the economy, he ran the highly respected
locomotive production operations of GE.
The debt instruments used in PE-led deals, for example, actually embody in a detailed set of
heavily negotiated contracts the terms of a complex new social relationship between investors,
PE fund managers, investment bankers, and managers of the target companies. The PE fund
must have within it a concentration of very specialized talent to coordinate the takeover
process. The partners of PE funds tend to have backgrounds in the financial markets and are
very sensitive to the concerns of the professionals who invest on behalf of large institutions
such as pension funds. In turn—and this is crucial— today’s buyouts, as I suggested, are
largely friendly transactions where the buyout fund plans to work closely with existing
management because the PE fund partners know these executives have crucial inside
knowledge about the target firm. A clear example of this is the Cerberus buyout of Chrysler:
the new owners announced their intention to keep Thomas LaSorda on board as president
because he was thought to have a good relationship with the leaders of the UAW. Because
significant concessions from the UAW were and will continue to be a major goal of the
buyout, that relationship would be highly valued both by Cerberus and by the investors in the

billions of dollars in debt needed to carry out the transaction. In addition, the buyouts are
friendly with respect to the major shareholders who dominate U.S. corporations. Rather than
riding to the rescue of helpless dispersed shareholders, then, PE funds must engage skillfully
the complex alliance between managerial and operational employees, on the one hand, and
the large institutional investors like pension funds and hedge funds that together own today’s
public corporations.
We are not witnessing in the early twenty-first century some kind of coup d’état by “finance”
against the “real” economy, any more than the agency problems of the publicly traded
corporation meant that a new class of managers took power in the mid-twentieth century.
The rise of some widely traded public corporations in the era of Berle and Means should,
instead, have been seen as a successful effort to marry financial resources with managerial
talent in a new capitalist form. But even then many large companies retained concentrated
ownership among a few large shareholders. Today, we might be witnessing what Harvard
Business School’s Michael Jensen predicted in 1989 would be the “eclipse of the public
corporation.” But perhaps that should read the “eclipse of those still remaining widely traded
public corporations.” Private-equity-led buyouts represent an evolution in the effort by a
significant fraction of sophisticated players in the economy to forge new methods of
managing and controlling the process of creating and appropriating value from the labor force
on behalf of investors. It is possible that the concentration of expertise in finance with
operational know-how, may enhance the ability of capital to engineer greater returns. To
recognize the magnitude of the accomplishment of PE funds is not to support the result.
Instead, it helps to highlight the challenge for labor and the left. Private equity funds are doing
what capital has always done and will continue to do unless an alternative form of organizing
economic activity is established. A misguided fear of “financialization” does not bring us any
closer to exploring that alternative.

Stephen F. Diamond is an associate professor at Santa Clara University School of Law in
California, where he teaches corporate law.

FO O TNO TES:

[1 ] T h is a u t h or a dv ised t h e A FL-CIO on t h e Bla ck st on e IPO.

